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Europe during the financial crisis
*
 
 Csaba Csávás Szilárd Erhart  Anna Naszódi 
  Klára Pintér 
There is ample empirical evidence in the literature for the positive effect of central bank 
transparency on the economy. The main channel is that transparency reduces the uncertainty 
regarding future monetary policy and thereby it helps agents to make better investment, and 
saving decisions. In this paper, we document how the degree of transparency of central banks in 
Central and Eastern Europe has changed during periods of financial stress, and we argue that 
during the recent financial crisis central banks became less transparent. We investigate also 
how these changes affected the uncertainty in these economies, measured by the degree of 
disagreement across professional forecasters over the future short-term and long-term interest 
rates and also by their forecast accuracy. 
Keywords: central banking, transparency, financial crises, survey expectations, forecasting. 
1. Introduction 
Recently, the literature has provided some empirical evidence for the favorable effect of central bank 
transparency on the economic outcomes. The main channel is that transparency reduces the 
uncertainty regarding future monetary policy and thereby it helps agents to make better investment, 
savings and other decisions. By testing the first step of the channel, Swanson (2004), Ehrmann et al. 
(2010), and Csávás et al. (2012) find that the interest rate is forecasted with a higher level of precision 
by professional analysts when the central bank is more transparent. By testing the effect of 
transparency directly on macro variables, Chortareas et al. (2002) find that greater transparency about 
forward looking analysis of central banks is associated with lower inflation rate, and unchanged output 
volatility. 
Preceding the recent financial crisis, central banks have become more and more transparent all over 
the world. They implemented considerable changes in monetary policy communication, and many 
aspects of the central banks’ operational and monetary policy targets and modeling practice became 
unveiled. The increasing degree of central bank transparency has been clarified by Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006) inter alia, who published a transparency index for nine industrial countries covering the 
period between 1998 and 2002. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) expanded the number of countries and 
years covered by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). By using an even more comprehensive sample of 100 
countries for the period between 1998 and 2005, they confirmed that central bank transparency had an 
increasing tendency even until the mid 2000’s. 
In this paper, we examine whether financial stress in 2007, 2008 and 2009 has inclined central banks 
to become even more transparent. This question has already been investigated in the empirical 
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literature by using the transparency index of Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). Siklos (2010) has updated 
the index for the period between 2006 and 2009. By studying the updated index, he found the 
following. First, transparency continued to improve gradually on average even after 2005 although at a 
slower rate than before. Second, there are some obvious differences across country groups. The 
transparency index of developed countries stopped increasing in 2006. From then on, it remained 
unchanged. In contrast, transparency has risen steadily in the rest of the world with the most 
impressive developments taking place among the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
These findings are apparent from Table 1. 
Table 1: The transparency index across country groups. 
 
Source of data: Siklos (2010). 
Notes:  The data has been revised and modified by the authors of this paper. See Section 4.2.2 about 
the modifications. 
The categorization of countries into the group of developed, developing, and emerging is according to 
the IMF classification, published in the World Economic Outlook. 
CEE 4 countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
The potential explanations for these tendencies are as follows. First, the transparency index is 
constructed in a way that it has a maximum.1 Therefore, it cannot increase continuously forever. By 
the mid 2000’s, transparency might have already reached its limit in the developed countries and got 
close to it in many other countries. Second, the transparency index might have some limitations at 
measuring the exact degree of transparency and this limitation can be more apparent during periods of 
financial stress. (See Section 3 for the detailed analysis). Third, the global financial crisis of 2007-
2009 enforced changes in the monetary policies that might make it impossible for central banks to 
enhance transparency. Siklos (2010) has left the judgment of these explanations to future research. 
We contribute to the literature by analyzing the links between central bank transparency and financial 
system stability in many different ways. First, we document that the standard measure of transparency 
has hardly changed in some CEE countries during periods of financial stress.2 Second, we review the 
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 The analyzed countries are the CEE-4 countries. Although their transparency indices have increased even in the 
recent years as it is reported in the last column of Table 1, it can be attributed mostly to one outlier. This is 
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dimensions of transparency that might have changed during the recent financial crisis but cannot be 
measured by the standard transparency index. Third, we investigate how the unconventional monetary 
policy has influenced central bank transparency in the recent years. Finally, we estimate the link 
between transparency and accuracy of survey forecasts by applying a methodology similar to that of 
Ehrmann et al. (2010), and Csavas et al. (2010). By using this link, we aim to provide indirect 
empirical evidence for the hypothesized reduction of transparency during periods of financial stress. 
2. Stylized facts on financial stress and transparency 
In this Section, we examine how transparency evolved in four CEE countries. The analyzed countries 
are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. This group of countries provides us with a 
special opportunity to explore the link between transparency and financial stress for two reasons. First, 
these countries have been hit not only by the global financial crisis, but they had experienced episodes 
of severe financial stress even before 2005. Second, central bank transparency has not reached its limit 
by the early 2000’s in these countries. 
In this analysis, we use the financial stress index (FSI) that has been constructed by Balakrishnan et al. 
(2009). This index is similar to the index of Cardarelli et al. (2009) as both consists of the sub-indices 
measuring the stress in the banking sector, security markets, and the foreign exchange market. The 
main difference between these two indices is that while the index of Cardarelli et al. (2009) has been 
developed for the advanced economies, the one of Balakrishnan et al. (2009) suits the emerging 
countries better.3  
Figure 1 plots the time series of the financial stress index together with one of its sub-indices, the 
stock market volatility index for the analyzed 4 countries. According to the indices, these countries 
have been hit by as large shocks before 2005 as during the recent global financial crisis. Apparently, 
Poland’s financial stability was as much at risk in 1998 as in 2008. Although the financial stress index 
is not available for the other three countries for the year 1998, we know that these countries were 
affected just as much by the default of Russia on its external obligations in 1998 and the collapse of 
Long Term Capital Management in the same year as Poland. This is also reflected by the stock market 
volatility index in Figure 1. Another episode of financial stress was the dot-com crash that distressed 
mostly the Czech market at the end of 2000 and at the beginning of 2001. 
In order to get some idea on how transparency changes in periods of financial stress, we plotted the 
annual changes of the transparency index against the financial stress index in Figure 2. It clearly 
shows that the relationship is non-linear and negative. In relatively calm periods, when the stress index 
was below 3, central banks either increased the degree of transparency or maintained the previous 
level. During periods of financial stress (higher values of the financial stress index), the transparency 
of central banks in the CEE region has hardly changed. This finding is not an artificial consequence of 
the lack of data for the stress index for certain periods and countries. The relationship between 
financial stress and transparency is qualitatively the same, if we measure the stress with the stock 
market volatility index that is available for almost the entire sample. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Slovakia that joined the Euro zone in 2009 and imported a much higher degree of transparency from the ECB 
than they had before. 
3
 See Section 4.2.3 about the details of the financial stress index. 
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Figure 1: The financial stress index and the stock market volatility index between January 1998 
and April 2009. 
 
Source of data: Cardarelli et al. (2009). 
Note: The horizontal line is at value 3 of the left axis. 
Fortunately, our data on the 4 CEE countries makes it possible to judge some explanations for the lack 
of changes in the transparency index. Since transparency was not at its peak in the major part of the 
investigated period, and there were plenty of opportunities for central banks to become more 
transparent, it would not be fair to blame the transparency index for being bounded. It is more 
plausible that it is the financial stress that limits transparency. 
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Figure 2: Annual changes in the transparency index plotted against the financial stress index. 
Sample: January 1998 – April 2009, countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
 
Source of data: Cardarelli et al. (2009). 
Notes: Higher values of the transparency and stress indices are associated with a higher degree of 
transparency and more stress respectively. 
The red line is the regression line. 
The vertical line is at value 3. 
3. What dimensions of transparency have been affected by the financial 
crisis? 
Geraats (2002) distinguishes 5 dimensions of transparency that are (1) political transparency, (2) 
economic transparency, (3) procedural transparency, (4) policy transparency, and (5) operational 
transparency. Each of these dimensions is measured separately by the sub-indices of the transparency 
index. And the transparency index is the simple sum of the sub-indices. We showed in the previous 
Sections that recent updates of the transparency index reflect almost unchanged circumstances on 
average. This is also true for the sub-indices, because central banks have not made significant changes 
to their practices that are measured by the index. For instance, they kept on publishing their economic 
models, strategies and decisions. In this Section, we examine how transparency changed in each of its 
5 dimensions. We argue that all aspects of transparency have been affected by the financial crisis, and 
the impact was unfavorable. Figure 3 summarizes our arguments. 
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Figure 3: Components of the transparency index and the possible impacts of the financial crisis. 
 
Political transparency: as the financial crisis highlighted vulnerabilities in the financial systems in 
many countries, central banks became already formally recognized as an important pillar in the 
systemic supervisory institutional framework. However, it is in the shroud of opacity how 
responsibility for financial stability influenced the priority of central bank objectives. For example, 
Fed governor Ben Bernanke noted that central bank independence is essential, but it cannot be 
unconditional. “We are committed to exploring new ways to enhance the Federal Reserve's 
transparency without compromising our mandated monetary policy and financial stability objectives.” 
Borio (2009) claims that, stemming from informational gains the financial supervisory role of central 
banks can lead to synergies with the price stability objective. Nevertheless, the potential conflict of 
new goals with the price stability can affect transparency negatively. 
In addition, central banks have not even had legal mandate to follow the new objectives, while most 
central banks updated their policy goals in practice. Many central banks have targeted lower interest 
rates than their announced key policy rates. The ECB, for example, tolerated that short-term money 
market rates have been tied to the overnight deposit rate of the ECB, which implies an unannounced 
monetary loosening. 
In a recent study, Geraats (2008) also found that central banks across all monetary policy frameworks 
had become more transparent during the last decade, although there are significant differences in the 
degree of information disclosure across monetary policy frameworks. Central banks with inflation 
targeting have achieved the highest level of transparency, while monetary and exchange rate targeters 
have exhibited the lowest level in information disclosure. Although in terms of de-jure monetary 
frameworks central banks have not changed since the financial crisis in 2008, de-facto frameworks 
altered immensely, implying changes in communication practices, too. 
Economic transparency: most central banks had to realize that old models and economic data no 
longer apply in the post-financial-crisis “new world order”. Furthermore, conceptual understanding of 
the new world will take many years, as the data shortage also represents an obstacle for statistical 
Changing central bank transparency in Central and Eastern Europe during the financial crisis 
79 
analysis and forecasting. Under these circumstances central banks publish their usual reports, models 
and forecasts. So they seem transparent at first sight, while central bank economists and decision 
makers have lost their faith in these models and decision making is influenced more and more by 
expertise, judgment and gut feelings. 
Procedural and policy transparency: while many central banks promptly announce monetary policy 
decisions, and the explanation of decisions in normal times, most central banks are reluctant to 
communicate severe systemic distress and extraordinary risks, because it may just add to the turmoil 
and become self-fulfilling. 
Operational transparency: many central banks introduced unconventional monetary policy 
instruments in order to counteract the adverse effect of increased counterparty risk that led to the lack 
of liquidity in the markets and jumps in the prices. The markets have been supplied by much fewer 
information about these new instruments than about conventional instruments before. The next Section 
gives an overview on the unconventional instruments that were applied by the central banks in the 
CEE region in the crisis, and also on their impact on central bank transparency. 
3.1. Transparency and new monetary policy instruments 
The Eijffinger-Geraats transparency index was developed in an environment where central banks used 
almost exclusively the policy rates as an instrument to achieve their objectives, the primary objective 
being price stability in most cases. However, after the Lehman crisis, many central banks introduced 
unconventional monetary policy instruments (see a classification of these instruments in Yehoue et al., 
2009) and objectives other than the price stability gained higher priority. Since the Eijffinger-Geraats 
index is not able to capture the transparency related to these new instruments, we provide a brief 
assessment about how the new measures could alter central bank transparency. In this Section we 
review the practice of the 4 CEE central banks and that of the ECB. 
One of the new central bank measures introduced during the crisis provided liquidity for horizons 
longer than one day. Three CEE central banks in our sample (the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland) applied these instruments with maturities ranging from 2 weeks to 6 months. In contrast, in 
Slovakia the domestic interbank market was sufficiently liquid given the imminent euro adoption, thus 
the SNB did not have to introduce new measures. 4 The ECB introduced long-term liquidity providing 
operations with maturities up to 1 year. (See ECB, 2009). 
A common feature of the CEE countries is that their banking systems operate with a liquidity surplus. 
Therefore, there is no need for the monetary authorities to act as a liquidity provider in normal times. 
It was the malfunctioning of interbank money markets during the crisis that forced commercial banks 
to hoard liquid assets and necessitated the active assistance of the central bank. 
It is evident from Figure 4 that the 3-month interbank rates were above the policy rates on the Czech 
and Polish markets for several months after the Lehman crisis. This wedge has not reflected interest 
rate hike expectations, but the reluctance of banks to provide credit to each other on the interbank 
market due to higher counterparty risk. 5 In other words, the wedge was a premium for the extra risk. 
One of the objectives for liquidity providing measures was to reduce this premium. The premium not 
only makes loans expensive, but distorts the transmission mechanism as well, i.e., the transmission 
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5
 See the minutes of the CNB and NBP in the period between 2008 and 2009.   
http://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/bank_board_minutes/; 
http://www.nbp.pl/homen.aspx?f=/en/onbp/organizacja/minutes.html  
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from policy rate to market rates. The CNB explained their measure with the aim of fostering the 
functioning of the government bond market. Similar considerations prompted MNB to provide 
liquidity to primary dealers of the Hungarian government bond. The ECB had a further motivation to 
reduce long-term yield in a situation where the zero bound to the policy rate became effective. 
Figure 4: Central bank policy rates and 3-month interbank money market rates between 2007 
and 2009. 
 
Source: CNB, MNB, NBP, NBS, ECB. 
Notes: The interbank rates are the PRIBOR (Czech Republic), the BUBOR (Hungary), the WIBOR 
(Poland) and the BRIBOR (Slovakia). 
For Slovakia, the policy rate is replaced by that of the ECB and interbank rate is replaced by the 
EURIBOR since January 2009. 
Since central banks shifted from influencing market rates by setting the policy rate to directly 
intervening on the market, the overall transparency of the central bank can only be assessed by judging 
how much information has been revealed on these new instruments. Central banks disclosed the 
pricing and the quantity of these instruments. However, they were less transparent regarding the 
decision making about these instruments relative to the transparency of setting the policy rate.6 It is 
worth mentioning that even with perfect transparency, the effect of these on money markets would 
have been uncertain. For market participants to know what will be the market interest rates in the 
future, it is not enough to have information about the decision making of the central banks but also 
about how liquidity situation will be changed in the interbank market. 
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In both Poland and the Czech Republic, some of the interest rate cuts at the end of 2008 as well as in 
2009 were explained by the above mentioned distortion of the transparency mechanism: the aim was 
to bring the market interest rates in line with the interest rate which is considered optimal by the 
central bank.7 For market participants, this again could make it difficult to understand how exactly the 
central bank wanted to perform its monetary policy: by using new instruments to reduce market 
interest rates or by reducing the policy rate which can contribute to lower market interest rates if the 
premium on this latter remains unchanged. On the other hand, rate cuts were partly explained by 
arguments related to financial stability in which case it does not necessarily went against the logic of 
inflation targeting since the risks of undershooting the inflation goals were more pronounced. 
The MNB began to purchase government bonds in autumn 2008. The motivation was to restore the 
smooth functioning of the market and reduce the liquidity premium.8 Though the purchases were 
performed in a transparent way, via a tender procedure, the market did not have a clear idea of the 
level of long-term interest rates that the central bank intended to reach. Possibly, neither could the 
central bank specify how much of the increase in the government bond yields was due to liquidity 
premium, and not caused by fundamentals; thus, it was more difficult for market participants to 
forecast long-term interest rates. The covered bond purchase program of the ECB since June 2009 
(ECB, 2009) can be assessed in a similar way; the targeted long-term interest rate was not revealed. 
The MNB, the NBP and the ECB introduced currency swap instruments (Yehoue et al., 2009). The 
CEE countries supplied EUR and USD against domestic currencies as well as CHF against EUR, 
while the ECB provided USD and CHF. The aim was to provide foreign currency liquidity to the 
banking system and also to reduce the stress in financial markets (Moessner and Allen, 2010). Banai et 
al. (2009) describes central banks acting as ‘FX lender of last resort’. Regarding swap operations, the 
market didn’t have a clear idea on how decisions about the pricing of these instruments were made. 
E.g. the NBP communicated only that its price (the swap point) would be close to market prices.9 
Nevertheless, the lower transparency of the swap instruments possibly affected the uncertainty related 
to future interest rates denominated in domestic currency less. 
To conclude, the use of unconventional monetary policy instruments in the CEE region possibly 
lowered the central bank transparency regarding the objectives of the instruments, the explanation of 
decisions, or the achievement of operating goals, which are all important dimensions of transparency. 
4. Empirical analysis of the effect of transparency on economic uncertainty 
Some theoretical considerations and some stylized facts reviewed in Section 3 suggest that central 
banks become less transparent during periods of financial stress and this drop of transparency is not 
captured by the transparency index. In this Section, we use regression analysis to examine both the 
observed and the unobserved component of transparency and their affect on economic uncertainty. 
Following the practice of Swanson (2004), and Ehrmann et al. (2010), we measure uncertainty by the 
forecast accuracy of survey expectations and also by the dispersion of views of survey participants.  
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 E.g. according to the Minutes of the CNB on 17 December 2008, “... the imperfect transmission of monetary 
policy rates had to be compensated for by making larger changes to monetary policy rates.” 
http://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/bank_board_minutes/2008/amom_081217.html  
8
 http://english.mnb.hu/engine.aspx?page=mnben_pressreleases_2008&ContentID=11643  
9
 http://www.nbp.pl/Homen.aspx?f=/en/aktualnosci/2009/swap270409en.html  
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4.1. Econometric model and the hypotheses to be tested 
Our benchmark econometric model is given by 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = β0,𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝜎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡, (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 denotes the dependent variable characterizing the forecasts in country 𝑖 formed at time 𝑡. 
More precisely, it measures either the degree of disagreement across individual forecasters, or the 
forecast accuracy. On the right-hand-side of the equation, 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 denote the transparency 
index and the financial stress index respectively. The transparency index is either the total index, i.e., 
the sum of the sub-indices measuring different aspects of transparency, or one of the sub-indices. The 
volatility of the variable to be forecasted is 𝜎𝑖,𝑡, and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
The hypothesis that is usually tested in the literature is that the quality of forecasts depends negatively 
on central bank transparency (𝛽1 < 0), i.e., forecasters disagree less and make smaller forecast errors 
if the central bank is more transparent. As a first step, we also test the above hypothesis, however, our 
main focus is on the coefficient of the financial stress index 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡. Some theoretical considerations 
and some stylized facts reviewed in Section 3 suggest that central banks became less transparent 
during periods of financial stress and this decline of transparency could not be measured by the 
transparency index. Our aim is to provide empirical evidence for the presence of the unobserved 
reduction of transparency. The idea is to detect the unobserved component through its effect on the 
forecasts. The unobserved decline of transparency is likely to have the same effect on the forecasts as 
the observed component. The latter is that lower degree of transparency is associated with larger 
forecast errors and higher dispersion of views under our first hypothesis. Suppose that the first 
hypothesis is true, moreover, financial stress influences the forecasts dominantly through the changing 
transparency of the central bank. Under these two assumptions a positive coefficient of the financial 
stress index (𝛽2 > 0) implies that there is a positive measurement error in the transparency index 
during financial stress. 
It is important to note that the above interpretation depends highly on its assumptions. While we can 
easily test the first assumption, we cannot test the second one. The reason is that we can hardly 
distinguish empirically between the direct and the indirect effect of financial stress on the forecasts, 
where the latter works through the changing transparency of the central bank. Therefore, if the 
coefficient of the financial stress is positive, then all we can say is that either the unobserved 
component of transparency declines during periods of financial stress, or that financial stress has a 
direct effect on the forecasts. 
We control for the country fixed effect by 𝛽0,𝑖 that captures some country specific characteristics. 
These characteristics are, for instance, the following: how difficult it is in general to forecast the 
interest rate of the country; what the general level of skills of the forecasters is in the country, and also 
whether the dispersion of views is shaped by the interactions between the forecasters, i.e., whether 
there is a dominant forecaster in the country who is followed by some others. 
In addition to the country fixed effects, we control for the volatility of the variable to be forecasted 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡. We expect that the higher the volatility is, the more difficult the task of forecasting becomes. 
Hence, both the degree of disagreement and the absolute forecast error (𝛽3 > 0) increase. 
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4.2. Data 
In our empirical exercise, we use survey data on forecasts of short interest rates and long interest rates. 
In addition, we use historical data of these rates, in order to evaluate the performance of these 
forecasts. Finally, we apply some measures of transparency and a financial stress index. This section 
provides a detailed description of these data. Moreover, it discusses how the control variables are 
constructed. 
4.2.1 Data for the dependent variable 
We use the survey data of the Consensus Economics for both of the dependent variables in Equation 
(1), i.e., the degree of disagreement across individual forecasters, and the forecast accuracy. Consensus 
Economics surveys the views of a large group of professional forecasters on the future short and long-
term interest rates. It reports forecasts for a broad set of countries, including emerging countries in the 
CEE region. For the countries we analyze, the forecasted short-term interest rate is the 3-month 
interbank rate,10 while the long-term rate is 10-year government bond yield.11 The forecasts cover both 
short (3-monts) and long (1-year) horizon predictions. The sample is spanned by January 2003 and 
December 2009. The frequency is bimonthly prior to May 2007, afterwards it is monthly. Therefore, 
we have 58 forecast periods in our sample. Consensus Economics started to survey long-term forecasts 
only in 2006, therefore the sample of these forecasts is shorter. See Table 2 on some summary statistics 
of our measures of the degree of disagreement and the forecast accuracy. 
We measure the degree of disagreement of the individual forecasters by the standard deviation. Our 
choice is motivated by the fact that this statistics is readily available for us, as it is reported by the 
Consensus Economics. An alternative measure would be the inter-quartile range. The latter has the 
advantage over the standard deviation of not being sensitive to outliers. Ehrmann et al. (2010) used 
both measures in an empirical exercise similar to ours, and they found all of their results robust to the 
choice of the dispersion measure. Their finding supports that it is sufficient to use only the standard 
deviation of the individual forecasts as a measure of cross-sectional dispersion. 
We measure the forecast accuracy by the absolute forecast error of the consensus forecast, where the 
consensus forecast is the cross-sectional mean of the individual forecasts. This statistics, just like the 
standard deviation, is also reported by the Consensus Economics. In this respect we deviate again from 
the methodology of Ehrmann et al. (2010), since they used the average absolute forecast error and not 
the absolute error of the average forecasts. The average absolute forecast error depends not only on the 
forecast accuracy of the consensus forecast, but also on the dispersion of forecasts across individual 
forecasters. The latter is already captured by our previously introduced measure for the degree of 
disagreement. Since there is no point to measure the same effect twice, we decided to make our 
measure for forecast accuracy as much orthogonal to the degree of dispersion as possible. For this 
reason the absolute forecast error of the consensus forecast seemed to be a better choice than the 
average absolute forecast error. 
The historical data of the end-of-month short-term and long-term interest rates are from the 
Bloomberg. We collected interest rate data not only for the Czech koruna, Hungarian forint, Polish 
zloty, and Slovakian koruna, but also for the euro. We used the short-term euro rate as the historical 
rate for Slovakia from January 2009 on, when Slovakia joined the euro zone. 
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 The only exception is Hungary, where the forecasted short rate is the 3 month Treasury Bill rate. 
11
 The interest rate is measured in percentage and so is its standard error and the forecast error. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the cross-sectional dispersion and the forecast accuracy in the 
Consensus Economics dataset. Sample: 2003-2009, countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia. 
 
Source: Consensus Economics 
4.2.2 Measures of central bank transparency 
We use the traditional measure of central bank transparency, the so-called transparency index 
developed by Geraats (2002). It distinguishes 5 dimensions (political, economic, procedural, policy, 
and operational) described in Section 3. Each of these dimensions is measured separately by 3 sub-
indices. All the 15 sub-indices of the transparency index can take the value of 0, ½ or 1 according to 
the practice of the investigated central bank implying that the total index can take the minimum of 0 
and the maximum of 15 (the higher value indicating a more transparent central banking practice). 
Central bank communication practices have been surveyed by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), Dincer 
and Eichengreen (2007), and Siklos (2010) using the same methodology. In our empirical analysis we 
used the latest update by Siklos (2010). We implemented, however, the following minor modifications 
in his dataset. The Czech National Bank and National Bank of Hungary have been publishing 
individual voting records since 2008 and 2005 respectively, hence the value of sub-index 3.c is 
changed to 1 from 0.5 for both countries. Furthermore, Slovakia introduced the euro in January 2009, 
therefore, we assigned the values of the transparency index of ECB to Slovakia since then. 
4.2.3 Measures of financial stress 
We use the financial stress index (FSI) that has been constructed by Balakrishnan et al. (2009).12 This 
index is a modified version of the comprehensive index of Cardarelli et al. (2009). Both indices have 
three subcomponents: (i) banking sector (the slope of the yield curve, TED spread, beta of banking 
sector stock), (ii) securities markets (corporate bonds spread, stock market returns and time-varying 
volatility of stock return) and (iii) exchange rate (time varying volatility of NEER change). In contrast 
to the index of Cardarelli et al. (2009), the index of Balakrishnan et al. (2009) has been developed for 
emerging economies. For instance, it consists of measures for exchange rate pressures and sovereign 
debt spread that are more relevant for emerging economies than to developed ones. 
                                                     
12
 The series of the financial stress index can be downloaded from  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=23039.0  
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4.2.4 Volatility of the variables to be forecasted 
In order to judge how transparency and financial stress affect the quality of forecasts, we control for 
the overall difficulty of forecasting. In the model specification of Equation (1), the control variable is 
the annualized volatility of the variable to be forecasted. It is calculated from the daily interest rate 
data of 20 days preceding the survey date. The daily historical data are from Bloomberg. 
4.3. Estimation results 
This Section summarizes the estimation results of Equation (1). In order to see which aspects of 
transparency can be the most important in terms of coordinating individual expectations, not only the 
total index of transparency is used as explanatory variable but also some of the sub-indices measuring 
different aspects of transparency. In certain dimensions, there is only moderate variation in the data, or 
the sub-index correlates highly with some other explanatory variables disabling us to run the 
regression. These dimensions are the political transparency, the policy transparency, and the 
operational transparency. The low variation in the political transparency is due to the fact that all 
central banks have already complied with most of the criteria of this aspect of transparency in the 
sample. 
Tables 3 and 4 report the estimates for the forecasted short rate and long rate respectively. The left 
panels of Table 3 show our results on the dispersion of individual short rate forecasts. Whenever the 
parameter of the transparency index or sub-index is significant, it is negative. Therefore, we can say 
that central bank transparency coordinates survey expectations in the sense of reducing the degree of 
disagreement over the 3-month-ahead and 1-year-ahead short rates. Moreover, the procedural aspects 
of transparency seem important as they have parameter estimates significant at 1% for both the short 
horizon and the long horizon forecasts. Its effect is significant also in economic terms. For instance, if 
a central bank starts to provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its monetary policy 
framework, then its transparency index increases by 1. Our estimates suggest that this measure 
decreases the standard deviation of the individual forecasts of the 3-months-ahead short rate by 8 basis 
points given everything else remains unchanged. This effect is not negligible, because the standard 
deviation of these forecasts is between 10 and 110 basis points as it is reported in Table 2. 
Our results on the forecast accuracy reported by the panels on the right-hand-side in Table 3, are in 
line with those on the dispersion of forecasts. Higher transparency is associated with significantly 
better forecasts. For instance, if the sub-index of the procedural transparency increases by 1, like in our 
previous example, then the absolute forecast error of the 3-months-ahead short rate decreases by 40 
basis points ceteris paribus. This effect is comparable in magnitude to the sample mean of the absolute 
forecast errors, which is 54 basis points. (See Table 2.) 
Table 4 reports the estimates for the long rate. Surprisingly, central bank transparency has the opposite 
effect on the long-term rate forecasts than on the short rate forecasts. Higher degree of transparency 
mostly comes with significantly bigger absolute forecast errors and more disperse views on the future 
10 year government bond yields. One potential explanation of this finding is provided by Morris and 
Shin (2002). They demonstrate that when central banks have noisy private information on the long-
term interest rate and market participants rely too much on public information then higher central bank 
transparency can lower social welfare and increase uncertainty. 
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Table 3: The effect of central bank transparency and financial stress on dispersion of the 
individual forecasts and forecast accuracy, where the forecasted variable is the short rate. 
Sample: 2003-2009, countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 4: The effect of central bank transparency and financial stress on dispersion of the 
individual forecasts and forecast accuracy, where the forecasted variable is the long rate. 
Sample: 2006-2009, countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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An alternative explanation is that our sample for the long rate forecasts is not representative and we 
cannot generalize the results obtained from the period between 2006 and 2009. Obviously, we do a 
false generalization, if the relationship between the transparency index and the forecasts is time-
varying and atypical during the years of financial stress. Unfortunately, we cannot check the stability 
of this relationship for the long rate forecasts, since these data are available only from 2006 on. 
However, we can do it for the short rate forecasts. To see whether the relationship between the 
transparency index and the short rate forecasts is time-varying, we re-estimate Equation (1). However, 
this time the sample period is the same as that of the long rate forecasts, i.e., spanned by 2006 and 
2009. Table 5 shows the results for the regressions, whenever estimation is possible. Unlike the 
estimates for the short rate obtained on the long sample (Table 3), but similar to the estimates for the 
long rate obtained on the short sample (Table 4), the estimates in Table 5 suggest that higher 
transparency is associated with higher degree of disagreement and less precise forecasts. 
Table 5: The effect of central bank transparency and financial stress on dispersion of the 
individual forecasts and forecast accuracy, where the forecasted variable is the short rate. 
Sample: 2006-2009, countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Although central banks may know less about the long rate than the market, it is unlikely to be true for 
the short rate given that its most important determinant is the policy rate. Therefore, we think that the 
explanation of Morris and Shin (2002) has only limited relevance at rationalizing the estimated 
relationship between transparency and forecasts. However, it is still an open question why the 
forecasts became relatively less precise in countries with more transparent central banks in the recent 
years. 
Turning to our second hypothesis, the coefficient of the financial stress index is either insignificant or 
significantly positive in Tables 3 and 4. The most probable explanation for this is that financial stress 
has a strong direct effect on the forecasts, and the tenser is the situation, the higher is the forecast error 
and the dispersion of views. However, if we think that all the direct effect of financial stress on 
uncertainty is controlled by the volatility of the variable to be forecasted, then the financial stress 
index accounts only for the effect that works through the central bank transparency. By assuming that 
in periods of financial stress the unobserved component of transparency declines and affects the 
forecasts the same way as the observed component, then the parameter of the stress index should have 
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the opposite sign as that of the transparency index. This is true for the estimates for the short rate 
obtained on the long sample.13 Therefore, this finding supports the presence of unobserved decline of 
transparency during the financial turmoil. 
Finally, we interpret the estimates for the coefficient of the volatility. The sign of the estimates are in 
line with our previous expectations. Higher historical volatility of forecasted interest rates is associated 
with higher forecast error and dispersion of views most of the times. Moreover, the estimates are 
significantly different from zero when the dependent variable is the standard deviation of the 3-month-
ahead short rate forecasts. (See the upper left panel in Table 3). 
5. Conclusions 
In the past, financial crises have always triggered important changes in the operation of central banks. 
The recent financial crisis has also played a pivotal role in forming central bank practices; however, 
recent updates of the transparency index reflect unchanged circumstances. Almost all the measurable 
aspects of transparency are the same in 2008 as in 2006, since central banks have kept on publishing 
their economic models, strategies and decisions. 
In this paper we have argued that during the recent financial crisis central banks indeed had become 
less transparent as an obvious consequence of applying unconventional measures. This decline of 
transparency has not been captured by the standard measure of transparency developed by Geraats 
(2002). In order to provide empirical evidence for the presence of measurement error in the 
transparency index, we have investigated the effect of transparency on the quality of survey forecasts.  
By examining the forecasts for the short rate of a sample covering the period between 2003 and 2006 
and 4 CEE countries, we found the following. First, the more transparent the central banks are, the 
smaller the absolute forecast errors are and the smaller the degree of disagreement across individual 
forecasters is after controlling for the overall difficulty of forecasting. This finding is in line with the 
literature. (See Swanson 2004, and Ehrmann et al. 2010). Second, forecasts for the short rate are less 
precise and more diverse in periods of financial stress even after controlling for the transparency 
index, the volatility of the variable to be forecasted and some country specific effects. This second 
finding can be explained either by the direct or the indirect effect of financial stress on economic 
uncertainty. If the dominant effect is the indirect one, which works through the central bank 
transparency, then we can think of the financial stress index as a proxy for the unobserved component 
of transparency and the second finding can be interpreted as an indirect evidence for the measurement 
error in the transparency index. 
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 In contrast to the estimates for the short rate forecasts obtained on the long sample, the estimates obtained on 
the short sample are such that the parameter of the stress index has the same sign as that of the transparency 
index in most of the cases. (See Tables 4 and 5.) Given that the short sample is not representative, we cannot rely 
much on these results. 
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